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ABSTRACT 
This contribution looks at the phenomenological thread that holds together Lindahl’s argument 
and traces its origin back to Husserl. It asks whether the reliance on the structures of collective 
intentionality is a necessary component to legal phenomenology and whether it puts Lindahl at 
odds with other phenomenological approaches such as Marion’s. It also asks whether the notion 
of ‘a-legality’ can sustain its position as a third value vis-à-vis the code difference of the legal 
system, in other words whether it can play the role of a ‘rejection value’, or whether it is in-
stead committed sooner or later to collapse into the negative pole of the legal/illegal coding of 
the law. 
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1. In Fault Lines of Globalization, Hans Lindahl has given us a profound and high-
ly original phenomenological reading of law. He offers it, in his own words, as ’a 
first-person plural concept of legal order’ and this concise formulation provides an 
interpretation of legality centred on the problem of intentionality: ‘the manifesta-
tion of something as something* for [a plural] someone.’  
Lindahl commits to a decidedly spatial conception of the meaning of legality, 
where the inside/outside distinction is a constitutive feature of any legal order and 
allows a first-person plural preferential conditioning between inside and outside. 
In his own words, ‘by closing itself as an inside with respect to an outside’ a ‘we’ 
lays claim to a space as its own.’ (68) Like Luhmann’s concept of ‘indication’, one 
might interject, the significant moment comes in the form of the positing of pref-
erence or positive value in the order of closure.  
The intriguing phenomenological moment in all this is the connection be-
tween the closure that comes with order and the disclosure of public space, and 
this connection between closure and disclosure that Lindahl returns to so often is 
a good place to begin this short excursus into Lindahl’s phenomenological account 
of legality. 
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If his point of departure is a topography of legal ‘place’ it is because the em-
phasis is originally on ‘what appears as space and what space allows to appear.’ 
The concern with appearance shoots through the book forming the phenomeno-
logical thread on which all else hangs. And the key notion of the ‘strange’ that he 
borrows from the phenomenologists Husserl and Waldenfels marks the moment of 
disruption of these spatial economies. The disruption assumes the name ‘a-
legality’.  
Lindahl says: 
 
According to Husserl, although intentions are always directed toward their 
object, the intended object appears with this or that determinate meaning. 
He distinguishes, accordingly, between the ‘object as it is intended’ and the ‘ob-
ject . . . which is intended’.1 Heidegger provides a particularly compact formu-
lation of intentionality when elucidating the structure of practical activity 
oriented to the manipulation of things: the disclosure of ‘something as some-
thing’.2  The single question that interests me is the following: What charac-
terises the intentional relation whereby something is revealed as something in 
law? (119) 
The main insight Lindahl borrows from Husserl is the correlation between the 
what of appearance and the structures of intentionality that take cognisance of it 
and, in that, effect its manifestation. We will refine this as we go along. The se-
cond debt is to the intersubjective moment of noesis – of the ‘making sense of’. The 
third is the distinction between what is familiar and what is strange: what is 
strange in effect emerges gradually as pivotal to Lindahl’s account of legal order-
ing.  In one of its most succinct formulations in the book: 
A fuller description of the intentional structure of legal acts would be, there-
fore, the following: the disclosure of something as something* from the per-
spective of a ‘we’ in joint action. To the extent that such disclosure is also al-
ways the co-disclosure of the referential unity whence it is intelligible who 
ought to do what, where and when, a collective is the correlate of a legal or-
der. In their involvement with others and with things, individual participants 
in a legal practice orient themselves as to the what, where, when and who of 
behaviour by actualising, however implicitly and even anonymously, the 
                                           
1 Husserl, 1970a,  578 (emphasis in the original). 
2 Heidegger, 1962, 189 (emphasis in the original). 
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first-person plural perspective of a ‘we’ in joint action. Succinctly, by way of 
legal acts we jointly disclose something as something* in a legal order. (126) 
This is both profound and highly suggestive. I want to take a step back to 
pick up the thread of phenomenology further back in order to see how much 
Lindahl has staked on the question of the manifestation of legal order and its in-
ternal connection to collective identity that becomes reflexive, or transparent, to 
itself through that conjunction. The identification of this conjunction between le-
gal ordering and the emergence of identity as dynamic,   explains Lindahl’s at-
tachment to the phenomenological method of Husserl, and accounts for his own 
very particular understanding of the reflexivity of collective action. In the final 
section, and in a more critical vein, I want to pose a query over the ‘manifesta-
tion’ of the ‘strange’, or of a-legality, in the constitutive role that Lindahl envis-
ages for it. 
 
 
2. What defines phenomenology is that objective themes on the one hand, and the 
modality of access to them on the other, cannot be separated: what appears, ap-
pears as something to someone. And thus whatever truth value we assign to ob-
jects cannot be done so independently of their giveness to structures of intention-
ality. The latter at least is true and foundational for Husserl who made the phe-
nomenological ‘breakthrough’ at the turn of the twentieth century. His phenom-
enology was conceived as the science of the intentional correlation of acts of con-
sciousness with their objects. His preoccupation, which on one reading accounts 
for the development of his theory from an initial exclusive focus on the object of 
intuition as sense perception, to temporal, cultural, etc, ‘objects’, was how one 
might account for the truth of acts of consciousness which, in his own words, are 
caught up in a ‘Heraclitean flux’. Since his point of departure was always the mo-
dality in which intentional lived experience correlated to its object, the funda-
mental problem of phenomenology was inextricably linked with its most pro-
found insight, that of the ‘origin’ of objects in consciousness. Husserl’s endeavour 
thereafter became that of ‘purifying’ consciousness of what we might call its 
worldly apperception, in order that it might ‘receive’ the reality of phenomena 
unencumbered by its immanent limitations. 
The steps in that endeavour are relatively familiar marks along the fascinat-
ing trajectory of the development of his thought, centring on the shifting notion 
of the phenomenological reduction: Husserlian phenomenology displaces ontology 
in the thesis that ‘Being’ must be reduced to intuition - made present - in order 
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that it appear as a phenomenon. In the early ‘breakthrough’ of the Logical inves-
tigations (1900) the ‘eidetic’ reduction introduced a distinction between an ‘empir-
ical’ and a ‘pure’ psychology, allowing Husserl a first form of ‘bracketing’ of the 
world so that the reality of the consciousness of it could emerge as something dif-
ferent to the reality it attempted to know. More importantly, it allowed the emer-
gence of a new understanding of intuition as categorial, because its orientation was 
toward universal categorial forms (‘essences’), as pertaining, in Husserl’s words, to 
the ‘pure form of possible objects of consciousness as such.’ The aim throughout 
was to direct intuition toward truths of reason rather than the factual truths of 
an empirical psychology. The General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology of 
1913 introduced the ‘transcendental’ reduction, while later Husserl turned to a 
‘genetic’ phenomenology whose emphasis was on intersubjectivity and history – 
Lindahl discusses these in turn. It is well beyond the remit of this short comment 
to look at these movements in Husserl’s thought in depth. Let us simply re-state 
that throughout its stages what is at stake is the modality of the correlation be-
tween acts of consciousness and the objects that give themselves in those acts, the 
correlation in other words between noesis (acts) and noema (objects).    
As fundamental a re-orientation of philosophical inquiry as this is, its very 
inaugurating gesture remains fundamentally opaque in its ‘terrifying simplicity’: 
to return to the objects in question. If we take Husserl’s classic definition - ‘[t]he 
word phenomenon is ambiguous by virtue of the essential correlation between ap-
pearing [Erscheinen] and that which appears [Erscheinden],’3  -  it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that the whole of phenomenology is contained in the 
promise and problématique of that ‘ambiguity’.  
By the time Husserl writes the Cartesian Meditations (1931) the world is ana-
lysed as that which constitutes itself in the course of the experience of a commu-
nity: the emphasis has moved to intersubjectivity. The development is traceable 
to Husserl’s insistence to account for the full extension of intentional conscious-
ness, of noesis, as it appears across its many forms (imagination, memory, empa-
thy) engaging what we might call both its social and temporal dimensions, and 
the different modes of being of the transcendental subjects as individual and col-
lective, intersubjective and generative communities. In the Idea of Phenomenology 
he defines: ‘the task [as] just this: within the field of pure evidence or self-
givenness to study all forms of givenness and all correlations and to conduct an 
elucidatory analysis of them all.’ (p 10) And in this context we have another sig-
nificant shift of the phenomenological insight in Husserl: it shifts from being a 
‘discovery’ of the thing in the world, as perceived by an act of consciousness, to a 
                                           
3 Quoted in Marion, 1998, 21. 
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‘justification’ of the meaning of its individuation as a phenomenon. Phenomena 
do not just appear to consciousness; their appearance is mediated through a 
commonality of experience and anticipation, furnished by memory, empathy, and 
imagination. Noesis is a category that engages a collective and is embedded in the 
context of the Heimwelt, a familiar world. Through such engagement and associa-
tion is the subject ‘awakened’ to an intending.  
Now Lindahl says clearly that he does not endorse Husserl's transcendental 
subjectivity as part of the phenomenological programme, but, on my reading, he 
does not clarify the core or magnitude of this disagreement. This is in any case 
perhaps incidental. But there is still something crucially relevant here in Husserl 
for Lindahl’s own argument. Along the temporal dimension, consciousness, from 
the very start, is conceived as caught up in time, never still, constitutively rest-
less, in a profound sense always-already an alteration of itself. And along the so-
cial dimension of inter-subjectivity, it is constitutively reliant on those associa-
tions that ‘awaken’ the subject to an active intending, associations that are em-
bedded in communal resources, in expectational/motivational structures of the 
lifeworld and its processes of symbolic reproduction. They inform the occasions 
and modalities of consciousness and provide for the dynamic unity of ‘we’ identi-
fications.4  
Of course Lindahl knows this well and Fault Lines develops a fascinating ac-
count of these movements in phenomenological thought. Drawing on the last im-
portant work of Husserl’s, the 1936 Crisis of European Sciences and Transcenden-
tal Phenomenology, Lindahl alerts us to Husserl’s careful account of how the 
phenomenality of the world is situated against a horizon, and is co-experienced by 
a plurality of consciousnesses, in a crucial way, thus, both ‘pre-given’ (horizon) 
and ‘co-given’ (intersubjectivity). He talks of    
a fundamental difference in the modes of appearance of things and of the 
world in which they are positioned. For the one, ‘things, objects . . ., are “giv-
en” as being valid for us in each case . . . but in principle only in such a way 
that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon’. 
For the other, ‘we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing 
objects; without particular objects of consciousness it cannot be actual’.5 In 
                                           
4 And this is why Ricoeur overstates his critique when he says that Husserl’s is ‘a 
new idealism the sense of being reduced to the simple correlate of the subjective 
modes of intention.’ Ricoeur, 1974, 9. 
5 Husserl, 1970b, 142. 
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addition to being co-given, the world is also pre-given, Husserl notes. There is 
always-already a world into which things, acts and events make their way, 
and which remains, even if in modified form, when they disappear. Indeed, in 
the absence of this pre-given world we could not even begin to make sense of a 
novel apparition as more or less unintelligible; that something cannot be 
completely understood presupposes a totality of meaning-relations with re-
spect to which it appears as ‘meaningless’.   (263) 
For Lindahl, whose primary concern, as we said, is to give us ‘a first-person 
plural concept of legal order’ there is something vastly important in this later 
work of Husserl’s (these themes do appear late in his oeuvre) about the plural sub-
ject-centredness of the appearance on the world:  
[P]henomenology has insisted … that a world is subject-relative. When de-
scribing the structures of the world, one describes its mode of givenness, that 
is, how it appears to us, where ‘us’ denotes both the first-person singular and 
the first-person plural perspective. In contrast to science, which seeks to fac-
tor out subject-relative aspects of knowledge in its quest for objectivity, phe-
nomenology has pointed out that the scientific endeavour presupposes and 
takes place on the ground of an experience of the world that is subject-
relative. Crucially, it is precisely insofar as the world is subject-relative that it 
not only ‘appears’ (to someone), but appears as bounded totality of meaning-
relations: as ‘horizonal’. Moreover, although a world is always co-given as a 
bounded totality of meaning-relations, its bounded character usually remains 
more or less invisible and unthematic for us.  (263-4) 
There is much to unpack here. What an interesting distinction this, between 
the thematic and the ‘unthematic’, and how improbable the passage of the latter 
to the former in the logic of thematising. ‘A-legality’ for Lindahl - the irruption of 
the strange - is absolutely crucial to this passage (of ‘thematising’). But before we 
go there, let us stay for a little longer with the emergence of the plural perspective 
as constitutive of what is ‘co-given’ and ‘pre-given’ to us as world - the social and 
temporal coordinates, respectively, of its ‘giveness’ or disclosure. Because 
Lindahl’s phenomenological take builds on both dimensions, the partiality (co-
given) and the temporality (pre-given) of the manifestation of phenomena, or as 
he focuses on law, of legal determinations.  
 
 
3. Throughout his work Husserl had been concerned with harnessing phenome-
nology to the extension of appearance. That is without doubt still crucial. But in 
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the later work a certain humility attaches itself to the phenomenological gaze 
such that the perceptual process appears increasingly inadequate; each perception 
achieves only partial givenness, what Husserl calls an Abschattung, a simple ad-
umbration. If individual acts of consciousness can only deliver partial givenness, 
Husserl will turn to intersubjectivity to redress that lack of completion, and to set 
it in history, between ‘retention’ and ‘protension’, or more simply between the 
givenness of what is received as horizon in the Heimwelt and the promise of an 
(indefinite) progress of Reason. 
It is in this context that we must place Lindahl’s trenchant formulation 
about the manifestation of legal phenomena as ‘reiterative anticipations’. Never 
outwith the horizon of iteration, or outwith the iter-ability of legal meanings, al-
ways in medias res, legal acts re-iterate and re-interpret, ‘disclosing ‘something as 
something anew’. Lindahl will invoke Husserl: ‘Every experience refers to the 
possibility . . . not only of explicating, step by step, the thing which has been given 
in a first view . . . but also of obtaining, little by little, as experience continues, 
new determinations of the same thing.’6 The temporal modality of legal 
phenomenality (disclosure) is evident in all this in the specific forms of the 
operationalisation of legal pasts, that Niklas Luhmann, in his own grand phe-
nomenological project, offered the terms ‘variety’ and ‘redundancy’ to describe. 
But is this staggering of phenomenality, this postponement of what can only 
ever appear at any one moment as incomplete and partial, not now asking too 
much of phenomenology as method? As method, it must be added, whose stark 
novelty was to insist on the irreducibility of appearance as originary departure, 
and with it the givenness in presence of phenomena realised without prior condi-
tion.7 With the correlation now to an open intersubjectivity, one in which the 
givenness of phenomena is never underwritten by anything like the completeness 
of the receiving structure, Husserl is increasingly drawn to an argument about a 
progressive realisation; even, arguably, a self-correcting process. What to make 
now of this partial, incremental appearance, that never exhausts the phenome-
non, that falls short of granting it signification, that merely postpones its truth? 
Why insist on intuition as condition of presence if intuition is partial? And does 
the correlation of appearance with a ‘collective’ or future – in both cases incom-
plete - intentionality not cancel out its promise? Why is Lindahl wedded to Hus-
serl’s correlation of disclosure and collective intentionality when it can only ever 
only partly deliver on its promise? 
                                           
6 Husserl, 1973, 32. In Lindahl, 129. 
7 To borrow Marion’s definition (Marion, 2012, 1). 
EMILIOS CHRISTODOULIDIS 
947 
 
In the face of this problem there are two lines of argumentation that diverge 
radically. The first is to submit the unruly and incomplete category of intention-
ality to the category of givenness, and make the latter the notion that organises 
the phenomenological method. This is the route taken by Jean-Luc Marion. The 
other is to remain with intentionality as at least equally co-implicated in organis-
ing disclosure. That is the route taken by Lindahl. Neither, arguably, abandon 
Husserl’s phenomenological project, although Marion might add that Husserl on-
ly ‘a contrario renders this path possible.’8 Let us look at them in turn with an 
emphasis on the respective dividends. 
 
The first reading: the phenomenology of givenness 
In Husserl’s words, phenomenology re-orients us to ‘every originary giving intui-
tion [as] a source of right for cognition - everything that offers itself originarily to 
us in intuition  … must simply be received for what it gives itself.’9 Husserl says 
this with his sight fixed on metaphysics that would typically posit grounds or 
conditions for knowledge or (let us call it with the phenomenologists) ‘world-
disclosure’. Husserl wants to insist on the originary givenness of that which ap-
pears in consciousness; originary because lacking conditions or grounds. In Mari-
on’s words ‘the givenness in presence of each thing is realised without any prior 
condition.’10 Marion quotes Husserl saying that ‘the originarily giving intuition is 
a source of right for cognition.’ The German formulation refers to ‘dem klar 
Gesehen sein Recht lassen’: a recognition of the right of what is seen clearly. In 
consciousness, in lived experience, and no other a priori, lies the ‘legitimate 
source’ of any appearance. Husserl will refer to this as the ‘principle of principles.’ 
For him ‘[p]henomenology frees presence from any condition or precondition for 
receiving what gives itself as it gives itself.’11  
And with this we come up against the problem of method. According to Mari-
on, the phenomenological method after all, is committed to letting phenomena 
manifest themselves. And in this it is, on one reading at least, a counter-method. 
Why does Marion call phenomenology a counter-method? After all phenomenolo-
gy, ‘to be sure, like all rigorous science, decides its own project, its own terrain, 
and its own method, thus taking the initiative as originally as possible.’ And yet, 
says Marion, ‘counter to all metaphysics, [phenomenology] has no other ambition 
                                           
8 Marion, 1998, 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Marion, 2012, 1. 
11 Ibid. 
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than to lose this initiative as quickly and completely as possible.’ ‘The methodo-
logical beginning establishes only the conditions for its own disappearance in the 
original manifestation of what shows itself.’12 
Marion invites us to see all the steps and turns in Husserl’s trajectory, the 
swerving and the ‘zigzagging’, as his attempts to deal with the paradox that the 
reductions, intuitions, intentions, fulfilments, appresentations, etc, that gave lev-
erage to apparition cannot be conceived as conditions or grounds for it, but must 
instead be undone in the name of allowing the phenomenon to appear as itself. 
Note the paradox that attaches to the terms ‘constitutes’ and reduces’ in the two 
extracts below, a paradox all the more alive as it is bound up with the acts of con-
stituting and reducing: Marion says: ‘The phenomenological method, even when it 
constitutes phenomena, is limited to letting them manifest themselves.’13 And lat-
er: ‘the phenomenological reduction never reduces except to givenness.’ Reduc-
tion ‘leads’ the phenomenon towards givenness; ‘[reduction] leads scattered, po-
tential, confused and uncertain visibles (mere appearances, outlines, impressions, 
vague intuitions, supposed facts, opinions, etc, to givenness according to their de-
gree of phenomenality.’14  
The key to addressing the paradox, Marion tells us, is in the fact that the 
methodological acts of constituting or reducing do not mean constructing or syn-
thesising but are instead harnessed to phenomenology’s task of facilitating the 
appearance of things in themselves. Crucially ‘the method does not run ahead of 
the phenomenon by fore-seeing it, pre-dicting it or pro-ducing it’ but instead ‘trav-
els in tandem with the phenomenon.’ (Marion, 2012, 9) As a negative methodolo-
gy perhaps, though one must be careful in using such a loaded term, it engages in 
the clearing exercise that suspends impurities (empirical psychologies, the 
blindspots of what is naturalised and taken for granted, etc) in a way that lends 
leverage to the manifestation of things themselves. Marion puts this beautifully: 
‘The reduction does nothing; it lets manifestation manifest itself.’ (10) And ‘the 
reduction must be done in order to undo it and let it become the apparition of 
what shows itself through it, though finally without it.’ It is this double move-
ment of performing and withdrawing – the essential phenomenological operation - 
that ‘counter-method’ attempts to capture. 
That is why Marion calls his phenomenology a phenomenology of givenness; 
and it is why ultimately he will depart from Husserl’s reduction to consciousness 
                                           
12 Ibid, 9. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, 15. 
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in the name of harnessing phenomenological reduction to givenness, turning it, in 
a fascinating way, self-referential and thus only true to itself. For our purposes 
what matters is his insistence that ‘givenness’, the givenness of phenomena, ‘is 
measured by its own standard, not that of intuition.’ (16) Because this, according 
to the other reading of phenomenology, that informs Lindahl’s position, gives up 
the constitutive connection to intentionality that, for them, is in fact what mat-
ters most. 
 
The second reading: ineliminable intentionality 
Lindahl’s reading of Husserl stays close to the text, at least in what regards the 
phenomenological reduction to consciousness. If being needs to be reduced to sub-
jective intuition as condition of its manifestation as a phenomenon, the reduction 
cannot be bracketed. In fact, the moment of subjectivity, the intentional act that 
receives the given remains significant in the manifestation. If the appearance of 
something as something is given to or received by structures of collective inten-
tionality, the receiving structure remains active in the manifestation. Further-
more, its active correlation with what appears to it, tied now in a dynamic unity of 
what is given and who receives it, can be thematised in the direction of how the 
reception might inaugurate reflection of and reconfiguration of the latter. Lindahl 
discusses the emergence of the ‘we’ as immanent to this process, which also ac-
counts for why it cannot be thought of in advance of those processes, in any sense 
a priori to them. The a posteriori is however qualified in terms of co-implication. 
In Lindahl’s vocabulary, it emerges in the modalities of responsiveness and ques-
tionability,15 in forcing the question (of the return to things in question) anew. 
Both immanence (responsiveness) and renewal (questionability) are thus con-
stitutive of all ‘we perspectives’. Lindahl focuses his analysis sometimes on nor-
mativity (the ‘creation of ought-places’ he calls them) sometimes on legality, 
sometimes indiscriminately. A distinction between the more general and more 
particular levels may make a difference even to the question of what is questiona-
ble, and therefore, in the way he has tied the two, to how a collective constitutes 
itself.  In any case his object is to inquire into how law appears from a first-person 
perspective that is necessarily unitary; Legal pluralism becomes a conceptual ab-
surdity on this account, because to ground legality as plural would undo the con-
stitutive gesture with which a collective we and its ‘ought place’ are mutually 
                                           
15 In earlier work in particular these were key terms. 
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constituted through a unitary act of closure.  These are weighty conceptual claims 
and for this reason Lindahl takes us back to phenomenology, so that he can de-
fend them in terms of the conditions of the possibility of appearance as such. In 
Husserl he finds intentionality as constitutive of appearance, though he will want 
to differentiate the non-discriminating ‘we’ of collective perception into ‘we both’ 
and ‘we together’. This important differentiation of the first-plural invocation be-
comes key to the analysis of Fault Lines.  
I will not explore these analyses further, analyses that I find highly convinc-
ing and highly original. Through them Lindahl offers us a way to conceptualise 
afresh the logic of co-disclosure, of the simultaneity of the emergence of a we-
perspective and the world in which it emplaces itself, the unity of the field of 
normative reference.16 The emergence, too, of the context of reciprocity within 
which practical/normative discourse is meaningful.  
I have instead focused this short contribution nearly singularly on the 
Husserlian connection that underlies Lindahl’s legal theory, between disclosure 
and (collective) intentionality. The Husserlian inheritance re-inscribes the ele-
ment of collective intentionality, as methodological presupposition, in the emer-
gence of the phenomenon of legality. A virtuous circle installs itself here. The 
emergence of legality presupposes a collective intentionality in a relationship of 
mutual constitution: that is the phenomenological insight, and the reduction to 
the ‘we’-perspective is the condition of disclosure. I would argue further that this 
mutual constitution also introduces a two-way ‘questionability’ between disclo-
sure and intentionality. The disclosure of ‘something as something anew’ enables 
also a reflection of the ‘we’ in the process, and at this junction the temporal rest-
lessness infects both sides. Disclosure and identity form a dynamic unity where 
what gives itself, as disclosure, to the structures of intentionality that receive it 
gives itself in the modality of a reflexivity that politicises collective identity as 
the latter ‘rises’ to receive it.  
 
 
4. I will end my comment on Hans Lindahl’s book with a query over the meaning 
of ‘a-legality’, with a special emphasis on its function. Lindahl explains that his 
‘enquiry into legality, illegality, and a-legality follows a trajectory tracing the 
passage from the articulation of the legal/illegal distinction in the ordinary course 
                                           
16 Remember: ‘Disclosure is also always the co-disclosure of the referential unity 
whence it is intelligible who ought to do what …  by way of legal acts we jointly 
disclose something as something* in a legal order.’ (126) 
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of joint action under law to its interruption by a-legality.’ (264) Otherwise the 
restless, dynamic nature of disclosure remains part naturalised and to that extent 
invisible or ‘unthematic’ to us. He quotes Husserl:  
[N]aturally normal [attitude] . . . is that of straightforwardly living to-
ward whatever objects are given, thus toward the world-horizon, in normal, 
unbroken constancy, in a synthetic coherence running through all acts. This 
normal, straightforward living, toward whatever objects are given, indicates 
that all our interests have their goals in objects. . . All our theoretical and 
practical themes, we can also say, lie always within the normal coherence of 
the life-horizon ‘world’.17 
Husserl draws a distinction between the intersubjective constitution of a 
shared world as a familiar world (Heimwelt), as for example in the quote above, 
and that of a strange world (Fremdwelt). Strangeness is pivotal. As Lindahl ex-
plains Husserl’s point, a world only manifests itself as a ‘familiar’ world, rather 
than as the world, when a collective encounters strangeness. The key argument 
about ‘a-legality’ in the book builds on the introduction of the ‘strange’, that ir-
rupts in the context of ‘normal, unbroken constancy’, and is, crucially, an inter-
ruption that cannot be domesticated by the order that it puts to question.    
In an important passage Lindahl says:  
[E]ach boundary drawn by a legal collective establishes what it deems to 
be important and relevant, partitioning it from what is unimportant and ir-
relevant. But because the unordered is a residual category, and as such opaque 
to joint action by a given legal collective, the divide between legal (dis)order 
and what is left unordered functions differently than boundaries within a legal 
order. On the one hand, boundaries join and separate elements within a unity. 
[But ] the divide between a legal order and its unordered is a limit. A limit 
marks the discontinuity and asymmetry between legal (dis)order and its cor-
relative domain of the unordered. Limits are neither legal nor illegal because 
the distinction between the legal and the illegal presupposes spatial, tem-
poral, subjective, and material boundaries which join and separate dimen-
sions of behaviour within the unity of a legal order. Everything that has been 
said earlier about limits and about frontiers, as the spatial limits of legal or-
ders, finds its conceptual justification in the distinction that a collective must 
draw between legal (dis)order and the unordered. (95, my emphases) 
                                           
17 Ibid, 144. 
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So much hangs on these formulations: the ‘opaque’, the ‘divide’ that must be 
‘drawn’, what limits ‘mark’, all of them indices of visibility or actions that make 
appear. 
The stake of intervention, the domain to be thematised, tapped and activat-
ed, is what normally lies ‘beyond the pale of practical interest’:    
The distinction between legality and illegality, as behaviour that is in and 
out of bounds, is a specification of this general feature of a home-world. On 
the other hand, the home-world has an external horizon which separates it 
from what Husserl calls an ‘irrelevant outside’ … As concerns law, this irrele-
vant outside, which lies beyond the pale of practical interest because it has 
been excluded from what is germane to joint action by a legal collective, is 
the domain of non-law. (93) 
In the topology of fault lines, a-legality is ‘out of bounds’ but also attaches it-
self (‘is not posited separately’) to the boundaries of normative ordering.  
If the boundary can only be thematised from the inside, it is that operation’s 
accompanying reference.   
‘Yet, although empty from the perspective of joint action by a collective, 
the domain of the unordered makes room for other legal orders, other collec-
tives which organize themselves as legal orders. Returning to our earlier ob-
servation, if the unordered is the ‘other’ of a collective self, then the other of a 
legal collective includes its others, that is, other legal collectives.  … In effect, 
this divide is not posited separately from the boundaries that determine who 
ought to do what, where, and when. To the contrary, the divide between legal 
(dis)order and the unordered runs along each of the boundaries whereby a col-
lective establishes who ought to do what, where, and when. (94-95) 
Couched in this language of intense liminality, Lindahl invites us to consider 
a breach in the ordering (and recurrent reaffirmation) of the familiar world in vir-
tue of that which carries a normative claim that cuts across and brings to ques-
tion legality’s normal, quotidian, distributions of entitlement and right. To put 
my query, I need to take more gradually the processes of drawing and contesting 
distinctions. Let us look back at how the argument unfolds, with the help of some 
very elementary systems-theory, conscious all the time that it is not the language 
that Lindahl deploys. The operationalisation of the distinction between legality 
and illegality reproduces the legal system by ascribing these values to acts in the 
world. The distinction between the positive and negative value opens up the con-
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tingency space for law that emplaces all possible states, acts and events within that 
space; not only is everything legal or illegal, tertium non datur, but something is 
legal in that it is not illegal: the negative value is also the ‘reflection value’ in a 
system that vests meaning in events by closing off its domain self-referentially. It 
follows from this that 'illegality' is as internal, and as productive, to the legal sys-
tem as is the ascription of legality. The illegal is not the index of any outside: it is 
instead the negative value of the legal and thus a 'duplication value' that allows 
an event to register as meaningful because it could be otherwise: it could be illegal 
(and vice versa). Of course the law needs to break its symmetry and relate to the 
world; but reach to the domain of the ‘outside’ is mediated by the founding dis-
tinction - the code - of legality. None of this is very far off from Lindahl’s own 
analysis. 
Now of course this closed ‘duality’ of the operation of coding needs to be both 
unfolded (it must refer to something outside it, events in the world, states of in-
tention of  actors, the pragmatics of social interchange, etc) and interrupted. The 
latter, the field of interruption, discontinuity and irruption, is what Lindahl in-
vites us to think with the help of the concept of a-legality. But before we get 
there, let us stay a little longer with the notion of interruption. The operation of 
legality is interrupted when the normal reproduction of the system is ‘surprised’ 
in some way: either because classifications are challenged (e.g. indeterminacy) or 
because contradictions appear (e.g. conflict of laws, gaps) or because innovative 
interpretations are suggested and tested at the system’s entry points – typically 
court decisions. Legal interpretation here introduces a level of scrutiny over the 
proper distribution of legality and illegality to new events. But, as Lindahl says, 
at this level the interruption occurs and is handled within the referential unity of 
the legal system.   
How much of this opportunity for systemic renewal draws from the ‘strange’? 
On one reading, none of it, if the robust claims of a-legality are to be taken seri-
ously. The system’s ascriptions of legality and illegality, however imaginatively 
reconfigured, are always resistant to those chomeurs at Lafayette who, through 
their actions, disrupt this - our - normative order with its distribution of entitle-
ments to invoke instead a more just one that is attentive to need. But then, if one 
focuses on ‘habituality’ maybe one is overstating the level of challenge. Lindahl 
says:   
The habituality of legal practices, whereby the joint action becomes ‘se-
cond nature’ to actors, is a constitutive feature of legal intentionality in the 
mode of legal understanding. The point of a legal practice becomes the object 
of explicit attention when the theoretical attitude sets in, when that which 
Lindahl’s Phenomenology of Legality 
 
 
954 
 
agents understand themselves and their fellow participants as doing together 
is interrupted. This is the moment at which legal understanding yields to legal 
interpretation …   (85, my emph.) 
To be sure legal interpretation here introduces another level of scrutiny over 
the proper distribution of legality and illegality to new events. But the ‘interrup-
tion’ occurs and in still handled within the referential unity of the legal system even 
if the mobilisation of resources as far as the legal system is concerned, is 
thematised through the distinction between legal understanding and legal inter-
pretation. The ‘ordering achievement of legal acts’ (119) across the various axes 
(material, social, temporal) of legal meaning operate within the boundary of that 
unity, according to Lindahl’s trenchant formulation, as ‘reiterative anticipations’. 
Never outwith the horizon of iteration, or outwith the iter-ability of legal mean-
ings, legal acts re-iterate and re-interpret, ‘disclosing ‘something as something 
anew’.   
But a-legality’s ambivalence now stretches across to a second type of inter-
ruption, this time of the second-order; it is one that must be understood as non-
productive to the ordering because, to perform the function that Lindahl attrib-
utes to it, it must force a challenge to the very unity of reference of the system. 
This involves an ‘incompossible’ act because it stands incongruent to the act of 
interpretation that may have integrated it productively within that unity. A-
legality taps a limit. In this world of intense liminality, what is forced into ap-
pearance gets its traction from the incompossibility, the impossibility of contain-
ment however reconfigured the ordering. But to remain incompossible, resistant 
and ruptural it needs to be insisted on and acted on against the order it challenges. 
The following extract by Lindahl captures the richness of this ambivalence 
beautifully: 
In an important passage of his posthumously published notes on the phe-
nomenology of intersubjectivity, [Husserl] formulates this contrast in the 
form of a question: ‘Does not the world as an environing life-world, hence as a 
practical environing world, have an unpractical horizon, a [domain of the] 
unexperienced and unexperienceable, which is not merely “out of bounds” 
(ausser Spiel) practically (which would already be practical), but rather a 
horizon that is not at all in question for praxis?’ (93)  
The task of a-legality as I understand it relates to what ‘is not at all in ques-
tion for praxis.’ The irruption that it invites is to merge that other horizon with 
ours, in order to bring another world into view. Praxis philosophy had, at one 
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point in its history at least, attached itself to that task too departing from a ma-
terial premise. But that would take our discussion in yet another direction.  Let us 
stay with this one and attempt to formulate the dilemma concisely. 
Maybe one way to put it, as Lindahl himself often reminds us, is that whatev-
er boundary is in question can only be thematised from the inside. The a-legal on-
ly ever runs alongside legality, and it is legality that marks a-legality’s intrusions 
in its own lexicon and within the ambit of the referential unity that only legality 
(vis-à-vis illegality) can furnish. And what in the end remains problematic in the 
distinction of levels is that a-legality hovers uncomfortably between them. It pro-
fesses a radical discontinuity. But to mark a limit, to mark anything, its reception 
must be in terms that precede its newness. One might put the question in this 
context in this way: On what register is a-legality going to state its claim? How 
are we to understand its semiosis? I would suggest, against Lindahl here, that its 
claim is in the field of being-against, that its demand is irreducibly political, irre-
ducibly, that is, to the semantic field of legality, conceivable only on a register 
that, if one might put it teasingly in a way that Hans is surely going to object to, 
as constituent yields nothing at all to the order of the ‘constituted’. 
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